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Alland. The Artistic Animal: An Inquiry into the
Biological Roots of Art.
Author's Response
FloraS. Kaplan 's review of my book The Artistic Animal in
Studies [5(2):132-135] is so full of distortions, misreadings, and errors that I cannot let it go unanswered. It
should be as ludicrous to others as it is painful to me to
equate my work on art with sociobiology, yet I stand accused by Professor Kaplan of having written a
sociobiological explanation of artistic behavior. Clearly
Professor Kaplan is unable to distinguish between attempts to investigate the biological roots of specific cultural behaviors and sociobiology, which offers biological
explanations not only of origins but of differences in behavior among contemporary individuals and social
groups. Furthermore, sociobiologists claim to find specific continuities between what they pretend is genetically based instinctive behavior in lower animals and
analogous behavior in humans. In my book I am careful to
distinguish between the behavior of lower animals as it
might relate to the emergence of artistic behavior in humans and artistic behavior per se. For example, on page
24 I say: "Not even a hint of it [artistic behavior] occurs in
the natural behavior of other species." And, as I point out,
my major argument about the emergence of art as a
uniquely human capacity is that in the biological sense
artistic behavior is not adaptive and thus not a product of
selection. Instead I suggest that it is an artifact of other
adaptive traits, some of which occur in nonhumans.
Although I list a series of traits that are undoubtedly
adaptive in any environment for most if not all primates
(play and exploratory behavior, fine-grain perceptual discrimination and good memory storage, sensitivity to certain kinds of form or gestalts in the environment), I reserve
one trait for the human species alone: This is what I call
transformation-representation. It is based on the ability of
humans to symbol and use metaphor, but its content is
purely cultural. Without this trait art as such cannot exist,
and it is for this reason that it is useless to talk about
artistic behavior in lower animals. As I say in the book, "It
is for these reasons that art, as part of culture, can only be
understood from the point of view of culture. If art has a
strong biological base, that base is manifested only in
the context of a particular history. Art does not stand
alone as a biological process, because one of its most
important aspects, transformation-representation, takes
its content from the specific moment. Art and transformation-representation are only realizable historically"
(pp. 120-121).
1do not believe nor do I claim that artistic behavior is in
any way instinctive. I do believe that art as part of sym-
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bolic behavior of a special and uniquely human kind has
its roots in human evolutipn. I state clearly in the book,
and in several places, that the art of any particular culture
at any particular historical period is purely a cultural
question. My statement on page xi that "genetic potentialities, built into our brains, can generate artistic beh-avior in the sense of both creation and appreciation" has
been seized upon by Kaplan and can only be misunderstood when quoted out of context, for I go on to say in
the next sentence: "This exclusively human pattern determines an infinite space within which individual creativity can achieve its full expression."
I never extrapolate from, nor do I believe that one can
extrapolate from, a hereditary predisposition "to genes
and R-om genes to specific behavior as complex and varied as expressive behavior in the visual arts, music,
dance, theatre, and ritual" (Kaplan 1977:132). Her misunderstanding of my point of view is blatant when she cites
pages 32 and 63 'of my book as evidence for the above
interpretation. On page 32, I stress that lower animals that
either respond to form (not art) or play with form are in no
way engaging in artistic behavior. On that page I say in
an italicized sentence, "painting apes are not artists."
Kaplan also questions my discussion of ape "painting"
on the ground that apes are not our ancestors (which, of
course, they are not) and because their painting may
simply result from pleasurable motor activities. I agree
that it is dangerous to extrapolate from apes to humans,
but as close genetic relatives they can tell us something
about primate capacities in general, especially when
these are shared capacities. As for pleasure in motor
activity, I can only agree that this is probably the major, if
not the only, reason apes "paint," but one ingredient of
artisitic pleasure is just that: motor pleasure. Clearly,
however, the illustration in my book of Nim Chimpsky's
copy of a square, a circle, and a triangle is more than
simple motor pleasure, if less than art.
On page 63 of The Artistic Animal my discussion of
brain function refers specifically to possible right- versus
left-hemisphere control of visual art and music. I am surprised that Kaplan finds these suggestions unsupported
by the evidence, since there is a large literature on
lateral ization. I also cite Howard Gardner's book The
Shattered Mind (Knopf, 1975) to indicate certain differences between human linguistic behavior which is transformative and communication (not language) in lower
animals. Gardner points out that damage to the right
hemisphere may leave ordinary syntax and vocabulary
intact but disturb the ability of humans to use and understand metaphor. Furthermore, while I do not attempt to
locate artistic behavior in a specific part of the brain
(I fully agree with Kaplan that such behavior is complex
and must be diffuse), we do know that certain perceptual
inputs (such as line angles) are decoded not only in particular regions of the brain, but in specific cells! Finegrain perceptual discrimination is one of the pre-

94

studies in Visual Communication

adaptations for artistic behavior that I cite in my book,
and this kind of perception is closely linked to the kind of
specific cell activity noted here.
Professor Kaplan suffers from that disease of scholarship known as reference mongering. She cites a long
string of references to indicate that "The present study of
hominid evolution encompasses a series of competing
models and interpretations based on the same fossil record: seed-eaters as opposed to hunters as opposed to
hunters and scavengers" (Kaplan 1977:132). I do not deny
the complex issues Kaplan raises, but they have absolutely nothing to do with the arguments in my book, since
I make no attempt to discuss the stages of human evolution as they apply to the emergence of art. Rather I point
out that, whatever the route taken, the traits that are preadaptations for artistic behavior must have occurred for
human evolution to have occurred as it did, and for art to
have emerged as a specifically human trait. The adaptations I dwell on fit a// the models of human evolution, and
they are not in any way related to specific stages of
that evolution.
The goals of anthropology are to explain both the
similarities and differences that occur among human
groups. Most anthropologists concentrate on the differences. My book, in the tradition of searching for what is
known as the psychic unity of humankind, attempts to
understand the basis for one important area of similarity:
the capacity for artistic behavior. Therefore, it is outrageous to accuse me of ignoring differences: "These kinds
of differences and much ethnographic detail are lost in
studies which focus on the underlying similarities" (Kaplan 1977:133). Who can deny this statement? But a study
of differences, as wide as they are and as important as
they are (as I myself point out), will never yield information on what we have in common as a species. Kaplan
demands that I play the wrong game according to her
rules!
The same problem arises when Kaplan accuses me of
circular reasoning. "'Good form' produces an aesthetic
response in 'sensitive individuals.'" This is one of the many
examples of circular reasoning found in the book: aesthetic response is defined by the very individuals whorespond to aesthetics, and good form is later distinguished
from bad form by these same sensitive individuals" (Kaplan 1977:134). My statement is based on empirical findings and not on definitions. When random subjects in
different cultures are asked to make aesthetic judgments
from the same sample of art, there is high agreement
within cultures but no significant agreement between cultures. When the same samples are shown to people interested and involved in art, the agreement becomes
significant between cultures even when the subjects
have no familiarity with the art used in the experiment.
What we are apparently getting at here is response to
"good form," an element (not the only one; I speak of
convention and structure as well) in art appreciation.

In an attempt to bury me under her own erudition Kaplan indulges in a long exegesis of an erased de Kooning
by Robert Rauschenberg and criticizes my equating it
with subway graffiti. Everything she says about the Rauschenberg work is true. It does, as she states, have its art
history. Kaplan is also correct when she points out that
subway graffiti are not action paintings, at least not in the
sense that the term has meaning in recent modern art. But
in all that rhetoric Kaplan totally loses sight of the simple
point I was trying to make in an introductory chapter. The
point of Chapter I in The Artistic Animal is merely to convince those who need convincing that the net of art is
spread wide and goes beyond what many laymen consider art to be. When I said that subway graffiti are an
example of life imitating art (a very small point in the
book, by the way), I meant that the erased de Kooning
and erased subway graffiti share certain formal elements
that exist apart from art history and interpretation. The
more one becomes open to art in life, the more one can
make the transformations necessary to (in a real sense)
create one's own art. Wrapped buildings (wrapped in the
winter to keep construction workers out of the cold) remind me of Cristo's work, even though I know (but how
many laymen know?) that all of Cristo's wrappings have
both aesthetic and political points to make. The whole
nature of the game of art is such that formally similar
phenomena can produce transformative reverberations of
an aesthetic sort when connections are made between
them. For me, at least, to say that "life imitates art" is to
say that art often provides a means for seeing the mundane in new, exciting, and aesthetic ways.
Also, for the record, when I say that subway graffiti are
action paintings, I mean this in the same sense as their
artists do: they tell me that they enjoy seeing their graffiti
speed through the city. The actual graffiti are planned in
advance, but their artistic life is enhanced by the motion
of the subway cars that bear them.
Alexander AI land

Reviewer's Reply
Let me begin my reply to Alland's emotional and wildswinging attacks in response to my review of his book,
The Artistic Animal, by saying that such attacks do not
elevate either the discussion or his stature. I might add
that it is a little difficult, and even humorous, to take seriously his attempt, in a parting attack, to strike a humble
pose. He is, after all, the author who has attempted to
give us an illustrated, worldwide, cross-cultural, and evolutionary theory of the origins of art in some 140 pages.

Reviews and Discussion

I can appreciate AI land's distress if he thinks he is
being classed as a sociobiologist. He obviously sees
himself on the side of culture, and as a humanist. The
review referred only to the book's potential for extending
the "sociobiological debate," into areas of expressive culture. Nowhere in the review did I suggest that AI land
consciously supports sociobiology. What is obvious, like
it or not, is that the book itself will be identified, certainly
in the public mind, with a sociobiological approach, presenting as it does an organic, genetic, and evolutionary
basis for the origins of art. Here I would remind readers
that the subtitle of this popular paperback is An Inquiry
into the Biological Roots of Art. Note, too, that the cover
illustration is a painter's palette with the head of a
"gorilla" (quotes mine) substituted at one end for a color,
as a kind of subtle visual surprise. It is a surprise which
shows very graphically the kind of linkage which I have
pointed to in my review, and which is pointed at the public. AI land could have indicated in his reply that he had,
perhaps, argued with his publishers and regretted any
confusion caused by the subtitle and choice of cover, but
he does not. The association set in motion by the book's
title, subtitle, and cover are carried forward immediately
in the opening paragraph of the preface, which asserts
the existence of "genetic potentialities, built into our
brains" (regardless of the stated "infinite space" they are
supposed to create) (p. xi).
Alland makes a distinction between investigating the
biological roots of specific cultural behaviors and biological explanations by sociobiologists of origins and differences among contemporary individuals and social
groups; and he oversimplifies the sociobiological approach, which does not exclude culture. In fact, if we
listen to Wilson's remarks in the course of a debate on
sociobiology with Marvin Harris, much of what he says is
compatible with what AI land is saying through much of
his book. That is not to say this makes AI land a
sociobiologist; it simply means that his book and its implications lend support to this approach.
Wilson sees sociobiology as concerned with social
behavior; although "it is not a specific theory about
human behavior ... it allows for any of a wide array of
possibilities" (The New York Times:18E, p. 3). Both Wilson
and Harris agree, generally, that human behavior is on a
genetic leash. It appears in their discussion that it is
Harris, the anthropologist, who wishes to focus on the
study of differences and Wilson, the sociobiologist, who
is interested in similarities. But this is as much a matter of
personal choice as epistemology, not inherent in the respective disciplines.
Wilson freely admits that from the biological point of
view "the human being is unique; that culture is overriding, and that therefor~ with reference to sociobiological
theory the human species is a wild card," and he leaves
the question open to empirical investigation. What is interesting about Wilson's remarks in this debate are his
convictions about the hard understructure in the form of
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emotional predisposition in learning rules that channel
cultural evolution and make biological investigation well
worthwhile.
Wilson feels that human beings are on a dual track of
evolution with their fastest track being cultural evolution;
and yet they have gotten up to this point by conventional
genetic evolution. These statements by the leading proponent of sociobiology, including his emphasis on the
existence of "programmed learning rules" and "understructure," do not seem wildly apart from All and's blend of
biology and culture, structure, and genetic blueprints.
Even Harris, not noted for taking mild positions, sees the
interrelationship between their differences mainly in
terms of emphasis and the focus they would give to research efforts.
I have simply called attention to the implications contained in The Artistic Animal and made them explicit. It
seems AI land is shocked by this. I would urge him then to
reread his book as carefully as I have, several times, and
to consider the implications of what he writes before release and not complain about them afterward. AI land
wants to have it both ways, and all ways: biology and
culture-separate but together, rooted but apart, adaptive but then nonadaptive. Is it that AI land means to say
that art is symbolic behavior?
The review I wrote focused on the book as written, not
on the intent of the author. I was careful to point out on the
very first page that the reader's view of the book will
"depend on your theoretical preference for dealing with
macroanalysis or microanalysis, for similarities or differences in human behavior" (p. 132). Alland declares I
wanted him to write it my way, to have been concerned
with differences, not similarities. Not so. The main problems with this book come from contradictory concepts
and circular definitions that preclude meaningful macroanalysis. True, AI land includes culture, history, ecology,
game theory, biology, and genetics in the origins of art.
But in not telling us what, where, how, and why-in including everything so as not to be found wanting in
anything-AIIand ends by giving us nothing to measure,
weigh, or test empirically or logically. My criticisms are
directed not to the fact that he fails to deal with "differences" but that he does not enable us to understand
much about "similarities" either.
AI land misinterprets the seriousness with which I
examined his biological claims for art, calling it "reference mongering," a presumably perjorative description.
However, in his response he hastens to assure everyone
that he has read most of the same sources. It seems
obvious in this context that the converse of such "mongering" is nonmongering, or sloppy scholarship. I gave only
a few examples of the latter from his book in my review (p.
135). I did not dwell on them since the book was directed
to a general audience. Nonetheless, the half-references
and nonreferencing of quotes and sources, and the absence of translations of foreign-language passages, will
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be frustrating for those who read his book. Indeed, it is
nearly impossible to tell what AI land has read and used
in the book from the inadequate bibliography provided,
sparsity of notes, and other such problems. His response
to my review will be useful for filling these gaps in the
book.
In discussing my remarks on the graffiti/de KooningRauschenberg analogy, AI land again ~sures us that he
has read all the same sources and knows the same
things I do. In fact he supports my points about graffiti
and their makers in all regards except in the conclusions
drawn. He then attempts to extend the discussion in his
response to the review by saying it is the "formal principles" which underlie both the erased subway car and the
erased de Kooning drawing that are alike. Here he repeats his original errors in a new form. And I confess I am
at a loss even to guess what formal principles he could
possibly mean or to detect them in such disparate subject matter, materials, and contexts.
In his closing comments on graffiti as "action painting,"
after acknowledging my points that graffiti are preplanned and outside the mainstream of art historical tradition, he insists that their motion on subway cars speeding by make them "action painting." While the young men
who paint graffiti unquestionably enjoy seeing their handiwork speed by, it does not alter the facts that for the New
York action painters it was the act of painting itself which
engaged them; it was not the end product or the speed
with which it was perceived, by them or anyone else. If
All and sees a connection between the two, it must remain
his own form of myopia: the analogy remains superficial
at best.
Similar errors recur in his protest of my characterization
of his definition of "good form" as circular. At the very
least he begs the question on this notion, which is central
to his thesis, when he writes, "My statement is based on
empirical findings and not on definitions" (p. 5). To say
that we have the answers before the question is framed is
to invite intellectual confusion.
Art, like "good form," is everywhere, according to
AI land, its formal principles and aesthetic appeal just
waiting to be discovered in natural and manmade phenomena by "sensitive individuals." He modestly offers
himself as a model of such sensitivity, illustrating his response with an example of plastic-enclosed buildings on
a construction site in bad weather. These, he notes, remind him of the "wrapped buildings" of Cristo: Such
"formally similar phenomena can produce transformative
reverberations of an aesthetic sort when connections are
made between them." Cristo's work serves as an example
of art enriching the "mundane," though Alland confides
that few laymen know that Cristo's wrappings have
"aesthetic and political points to make." Here we go
again. Though I am glad that Cristo has added to AI land's
heightened sensitivity in the vicinity of construction sites
in bad weather-is that the point of art? Is it not the
aesthetic and political points Cristo makes in the act of

wrapping? Western and other literary traditions have
been filled with recognition of the capacity to appreciate
nature and other phenomena unmodified by artists. Jane
Goodall long ago observed that even chimpanzees enjoyed the sunset.
Alland does in the Cristo example what he did in the
graffiti/de Kooning-Rauschenberg example; he obliterates the significance of the acts and their place in an art
historical context. This is justified, apparently, because of
undefined, but underlying formal principles, which escape most laymen though not sensitive individuals like
himself.
In his response to my review, AI land gives a far more
lucid and closely reasoned account of some of the ideas
which underly The Artistic Animal. Regrettably, this account is not in the book. My basic criticisms stand: inadequate methods and data to support the theory proffered; theory which is incapable of generating testable
hypotheses; generalizations and conclusions that exceed the data and theory.
AI land protests that his grand conception in the tradition of the psychic unity of mankind has been misinterpreted. The burden of proof, however, is on the author. It is
Alland who chooses to put his grand conception on the
psychic unity of mankind, the origins of art, its biological
roots, evolutionary development, profusion, and crosscultural expression from the paleolithic to airport and
modern art-and everything in between, including theater, ritual, dance, and music-into a paperback designed
for the general public, compressing and juxtaposing
complex ideas which are not developed. As I originally
noted in my review, a slight volume can succeed with a
closely reasoned and elegant argument, which is difficult
to achieve. Darwin, Freud, and Levi-Strauss, to mention
others who have been concerned with macroanalysis and
theory, elaborated their grand conceptions, based on
empirical data which they collected, in scholarly books of
a length needed to develop cogent and convincing arguments. Perhaps, AI land will eventually favor us with
such a volume.
I agree essentially with AI land that there is a predispositi.on for art in man, and that it is genetically based,
bemg part of our evolutionary heritage. As I stated in the
review, our differences concern the extent of the conclusions to be drawn at this time, and in the absence of
much-needed empirical studies in biology and art.
Flora S. Kaplan

